The Supreme Court’s dismissal of an appeal on October 13, which challenged the Delhi High Court’s decision not to pass a writ to expedite the finalization of the Delhi School Education (Amendment) Bill, 2015,

has raised important questions about the legislative process and the role of the judiciary in such matters. The Bill in question aimed to prohibit screening procedures in the admission of children at the pre-primary level in schools. The case was brought before a Bench consisting of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Sudhanshu Dhulia.

The petitioner in this case was Social Jurist, a Civil Rights Group composed of lawyers and social activists. Social Jurist argued that the Bill, which sought to ban screening procedures in nursery admissions in schools, had been pending since 2015, and its delay was not in the public interest. They contended that this delay has resulted in arbitrary admission procedures being followed by different schools at the pre-primary level. Social Jurist also relied on the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, to argue that eliminating the screening process for nursery admissions was essential for implementing the RTE Act.

However, the Delhi High Court, in its judgment, observed that once a bill has passed through the legislature of a state, it is presented to the Governor, who has the authority to grant or withhold assent or refer the bill to the President for assent. The High Court emphasized that the courts cannot interfere with this procedure or direct the Governor to act in a certain way. The High Court concluded that it was not proper for a High Court to instruct the Governor to set a timeframe for matters that fall within the Governor’s constitutional authority.

In the Supreme Court, during the exchange in the courtroom, the counsel representing the petitioner presented arguments regarding the significance and purpose of the bill. However, Justice Kaul raised a critical question: Can there be a mandamus to introduce a law? The Bench stressed that this was the essence of the High Court’s view and questioned whether the High Court’s decision was erroneous. The Supreme Court emphasized that it cannot provide a solution for every issue and that it was not within its jurisdiction to direct the introduction of a law.

The counsel attempted to clarify that they were not seeking a mandamus for the introduction of the law but were merely inquiring about the status of the bill. Justice Kaul responded by referencing past instances, such as the Rent Control Act, which remained unimplemented for extended periods. He noted that the delay in implementing the bill indicated a lack of intention on the part of the authorities to enforce the proposed law.

When asked about the year of introduction of the bill, the counsel indicated that it had been introduced in 2015, and it had been eight years since then. Justice Kaul expressed skepticism about the delay, suggesting that the authorities may not be genuinely interested in seeing the law come into effect. Despite the counsel’s efforts to persuade the Bench, the plea was ultimately dismissed.

This case raises important questions about the legislative process, the separation of powers, and the role of the judiciary in shaping and expediting legislative decisions. It highlights the tension between the judiciary’s oversight role and the independence of the legislative process, where the executive branch holds significant powers, including the Governor’s authority to grant or withhold assent to bills. In addition, it underscores the challenges and frustrations that can arise when important legislation is delayed, leaving issues unresolved.

The role of the judiciary in legislative matters is one of balance and restraint. While the courts have a crucial function in ensuring that the legislature acts within the bounds of the constitution, they also recognize that certain decisions and timelines are within the realm of the legislative and executive branches. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the principle that it cannot dictate the introduction or passage of a law, but it can scrutinize the legislative process to ensure that it adheres to constitutional principles.

The Delhi School Education (Amendment) Bill, 2015,

sought to address an issue of significant public interest – the screening procedure for admissions to nursery and pre-primary classes. Such procedures can have a substantial impact on children’s access to education and can influence the quality and inclusivity of the education system. The delay in finalizing and implementing this bill was a matter of concern for those advocating for education reform and child rights.

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) is a key piece of legislation that aims to ensure that every child has the right to free and compulsory education. It sets out various provisions related to admission procedures and the prohibition of screening processes, among other things. The argument made by Social Jurist was that the Delhi School Education (Amendment) Bill, 2015, was essential for implementing the RTE Act effectively, and the delay was detrimental to the interests of children seeking admission to pre-primary classes.

The Delhi High Court’s position was clear – once a bill has been passed by the legislative body, it is presented to the Governor for assent, and the High Court cannot instruct the Governor on how to act in this regard. This stance aligns with the constitutional principles of separation of powers and the authority vested in the executive branch. The High Court emphasized that it is not within its jurisdiction to direct the Governor to set a timeframe for matters that fall within the Governor’s domain.

The Supreme Court’s role in this case was to review the High Court’s decision and consider the arguments presented by the petitioner. The key question that emerged was whether the judiciary could compel the legislative branch to introduce or expedite a particular piece of legislation. The Supreme Court, in its response, underlined the constitutional limitations on its power and expressed reluctance to interfere in the legislative process.

Justice Kaul’s reference to past instances, such as the Rent Control Act, was significant. It highlighted the reality that the non-implementation of laws or the delay in doing so is not uncommon. It can reflect a lack of political will or other complex factors that are beyond the scope of the judiciary to address directly. The judiciary’s role is to interpret and apply the law, ensuring that it aligns with constitutional principles, but it cannot serve as a substitute for the legislative and executive branches in the implementation of laws.

The Court’s skepticism about the delay in passing the bill was a natural response to a situation where a proposed law had been pending for eight years without progress. However, it also underscored the Court’s recognition of its limits and the separation of powers. While the delay may be concerning, the Court’s view was that it could not intervene in the legislative process to expedite the bill.

In essence, this case highlights the delicate balance between the branches of government and the role of the judiciary in relation to the legislative process. It serves as a reminder of the constitutional framework that sets the parameters for each branch’s authority and the judiciary’s function of ensuring that those parameters are respected. While the delay in enacting important legislation can be frustrating, addressing it goes beyond the judiciary’s power and necessitates political and administrative action.

The Calcutta High Court rejects 2023 West Bengal Panchayat recount, upholds original count.

FACEBOOK